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Abstract 
To fulfill external accountability expectations social impact measurement has become an important 
practice for social enterprises. Yet, the ambiguity around social impact and its measurement leads to a 
friction amongst stakeholders involved in a social enterprise. Based on interviews with small-to-
medium-sized social enterprises, this paper investigates how social entrepreneurs handle the 
increasing pressure to measure social impact with formal methodologies through a bricolage lens. The 
findings show how social enterprises combine material and ideational bricolage as well as seek to 
delegitimize formal methodologies to increase the legitimacy of their bricolaged approaches for social 
impact measurement. 
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1. Introduction 
To fulfill external accountability expectations, to attract financial and other types of support, 
and to gain better insights in how to optimize operations, social impact measurement has become an 
important practice for social enterprises (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Ebrahim & Rangan, 
2014; Nicholls, 2009). Yet, this practice is contested (Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Mair & Martí, 2006; 
Paton, 2003). There is ambiguity, for example, about the nature of social impact (Choi & Majumdar, 
2014); the relationship between social enterprises’ interventions and social impact (Ebrahim & 
Rangan, 2014); and the methodologies to measure social impact (Nicholls, 2009). An underlying 
reason for this ambiguity is that, in contrast to accounting conventions for financial performance 
assessment, there are no generally agreed-upon methodologies or units for social impact measurement 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014; Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Nicholls, 2009). Many competing methodologies for 
social impact measurement exist, each with its own strengths, weaknesses, and purposes (McLoughlin 
et al., 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that social enterprises’ accountability to multiple 
stakeholders with disparate expectations and understandings is a relatively more critical problem than 
it is for for-profit firms (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Social enterprises thus feel compelled to show different 
evaluations of their social impact to their different stakeholders.  
The ambiguity around social impact and its measurement leads to frictions within and among 
the various different stakeholders involved in a social enterprise. On the one hand, the trend toward 
the rationalization and marketization of the social sector (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004) has led funders such as foundations, governments and other types of impact investors, as well 
as social entrepreneurs themselves, to increasingly value and expect formal measurements of social 
impact. Such formal methodologies ofr social impact measurement aim to create objective and 
empirically-based measures that capture the social impact of an organization, often with a goal of 
increasing standardization, verifiability, and accountability. By importing performance measurement 
and reporting practices from accounting and finance, funders and social enterprises aim to replicate 
the efficiency and accountability that such practices have afforded for-profit organizations to better 
run their organizations and to optimize their funding decisions (Brest, Katz, Peeler, & Stangler, 2012; 
Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Nicholls, 2009; Rourke, 2014). On the other 
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hand, attempts to integrate formal impact measurement into the social sector has revealed great 
challenges (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). As Emerson (2003: 40) argued, ‘any who advocate the social 
sector be held to greater accountability and reporting on the progress achieved toward the attainment 
of societal goals are told in no uncertain terms that, indeed, “some things simply can’t be measured 
and social value is one of them”’(Emerson, 2003: 40). While there is myriad of methods to measure 
social impact, the lack of conventions makes accountability to multiple stakeholders and for multiple 
purposes challenging (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Practitioners seem to share an unease about social impact 
measures not capturing their ‘true impact’ and doubt the effectiveness of social impact measurement 
to improve the outcomes of their interventions (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). Since social enterprises 
‘purposely locate their activities in areas where markets function poorly’ (Di Domenico, Haugh, & 
Tracey, 2010: 683), they also face severe resource constraints that can hinder the practice of social 
impact measurement (Nicholls, 2009). While the friction inherent in social impact measurement is 
well established in the literature (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Emerson, 2003; Kroeger & Weber, 2014; 
Nicholls, 2009), less well understood is how social enterprises contend with this friction.  
Based on interviews with small-to-medium-sized social enterprises, we investigate how social 
entrepreneurs handle the increasing pressure to measure social impact with formal methodologies. As 
is evident from the extant literature (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Emerson, 2003; Nicholls, 2009), 
social enterprises do not seem to unquestioningly comply with this pressure. Rather, they seek to 
balance the benefits of using formal methodologies with the costs of developing unfamiliar skills and 
redirecting attention and resources away from activities for venture growth (Rourke, 2014). Besides, 
as noted, doubts have been raised about the validity and usefulness of formal methodologies for social 
entrepreneurs’ and their stakeholders’ decision-making (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Holma & 
Kontinen, 2011; Mueller-Hirth, 2012). Hence, social entrepreneurs tend to approach social 
accountability demands in a critical fashion, using interpretive flexibility to balance these demands. In 
line with previous research (Nicholls, 2009), we expect social entrepreneurs to use bricolage for social 
impact measurement, consistent with their activities for value creation (Di Domenico et al., 2010). 
The concept of bricolage refers to making do with at-hand resources (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-
Strauss, 1962) and has become an important explanation for how social enterprises engage in resource 
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acquisition and problem solving (Desa & Basu, 2013; Di Domenico et al., 2010; Mair & Marti, 2009; 
Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009). In the context of social impact measurement, 
bricolage suggests that social enterprises use existing methodologies ‘strategically to support their 
various mission objectives with key stakeholders’ (Nicholls, 2009: 756).  
In investigating social enterprises’ strategic handling of accountability demands through a 
bricolage lens, the paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we show that social 
enterprises use elements of material and ideational bricolage simultaneously for the practice of social 
impact measurement (cf. Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-Strauss, 1962; Mair & Marti, 2009). The social 
entrepreneurs not only show evidence of material bricolage by using data they have at hand, but also 
of ideational bricolage by selectively using and modifying ideas behind the formal methodologies 
available to them while partly rejecting these as well (Carstensen, 2011). Second, we show that 
ideational bricolage involves a process of targeted delegitimization of stakeholders’ preferred 
conceptions of social impact and its measurement. Social entrepreneurs’ choice of ideational bricolage 
for social impact measurement rather than existing methodologies reflects a refusal to be constrained 
by limitations and critically enact their resource environment (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Di Domenico et 
al., 2010), in this case the relationship with funders. The social enterprises in our study perceive the 
demands for formal social impact measurement as a limitation and in response ‘test institutionalized 
definitions of orthodox practice’ (Baker & Nelson, 2005: 335). We contend that delegitimization of 
existing practices is a key component of bricolage in the context of social enterprise, as it allows the 
entrepreneurs to create space for new ideas about what social impact means in their specific context 
(cf. Carstensen, 2011). Third, we contend that by using delegitimization as part of bricolage, social 
entrepreneurs attempt to change the development of social impact measurement from borrowing 
performance measurement and reporting practices from accounting and finance to blending these with 
their own ideas of social impact (Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011). Social entrepreneurs do not 
merely criticize formal methodologies because they do not embrace the idea that formal social impact 
measurement represents the future of the social sector; their delegitimization rather serves the purpose 
of creating dissonance in these methodologies to use them in a way that fits their own understanding 
of social impact. 
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2. Social Impact Measurement: A Contested Management Practice 
As noted, there is a friction inherent in social impact measurement between the multiple 
stakeholders involved in a social enterprise with regard to their understanding of the nature of social 
impact and how it can be measured (Choi & Majumdar, 2014; Nicholls, 2009). A root cause of this 
friction is the lack of definitional clarity on social impact that also exists in the literature (Ebrahim & 
Rangan, 2014). According to Roche (1999: 21), impact refers to ‘significant or lasting changes in 
people’s lives, brought about by a given action or series of actions.’ Roche emphasizes that an impact 
need not have a lasting change in people’s lives, as long as it is significant. However, he conflates the 
concepts of impact and outcome. Defining impacts as ‘lasting changes in the lives of individuals’ and 
outcomes as ‘lasting results achieved at a community or societal level,’ Ebrahim and Rangan (2014: 
120) instead stress the different levels of analysis of the two. Accordingly, they argue that impact 
should be measured on the level of the funder not of the social enterprise because only funders have 
the scope to affect communities or societies. Notwithstanding their different interpretations, both 
studies juxtapose impact and outcome with outputs, which refer to the products or services a social 
intervention generates, and the immediate effect they have. To illustrate the above logic, for a social 
enterprise that provides low-cost cataract surgeries, restored sight for patients would be an output, 
whereas the immediate life-changes experienced by the person whose sight has been restored would 
be outcomes. The overall repercussions of people having their eyesight restored, both individually and 
to broader society, would be the impact (Millar & Hall, 2013).   
Another reason for a friction between stakeholders with regard to formal social impact 
measurement is the underlying assumption within most methodologies of a ‘causal chain’ or logic-
model’ running from inputs to activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts, respectively (Ebrahim & 
Rangan, 2014). The underlying logic of such methodologies is ‘an explicit theory or model of how the 
program causes the intended or observed outcomes’ (Rogers, Petrosino, Huebner, & Hacsi, 2000: 5) 
and then subdivides this theory into stages that link together to explain each part of the process that 
transforms inputs into impacts (Chen & Rossi, 1983; Donaldson, 2012; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Liket, 
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Rey-Garcia, & Maas, 2014). In contrast, practitioners with experience in implementing such formal 
methodologies often stress the causal ambiguity of this chain; they contend that impacts are difficult 
to understand with precision, much less calculate (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Emerson, 2003). 
Exogenous factors outside of the enterprise’s control may neutralize or counteract the intended effect 
of an intervention (or, there might not have been a causal relation to begin with). While outputs are 
largely controlled by the enterprise and can thus be measured, outcomes and impacts are more 
difficult to isolate and account for. Social enterprises operate in an ecosystem, including other social 
enterprises, businesses, and aid organizations, each of which may contribute to or interact with each 
other’s impacts. Attributing impact to a specific actor can thus be very difficult (Ebrahim & Rangan, 
2014; Roche, 1999).  
A friction between stakeholders also arises due to difficulties to translate rich, experiential 
information into simple, parsimonious measures of social impact. That is, there is a trade-off in social 
impact measurement between creating accounts that capture the experiential richness, variance, and 
flexibility of social entrepreneurs’ interpretations and accounts that are easily transferable and 
interpretable for funders. Inherent in this friction is an element of the different geographic and 
occupational standpoints of stakeholders involved. Social entrepreneurs’ evaluation of impact has a 
vast experiential element to it – their daily experiences provide them with rich contextual information 
(Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). Yet, much of this experience and context can be difficult to convey to 
other stakeholders (Putland, 2008; Simon, 1987). Funders’ direct experience, for example, may be 
limited to short visits or lacking altogether. Geographic and cultural distance restricts them from 
grasping the full significance and context of a social enterprise’s intervention and affects how they 
interpret information about the intervention (David & Fahey, 2000). For funders, it is difficult to 
know whether personal and anecdotal data has been cherry-picked or skewed. Consequently, they 
may disqualify experiential information in attempts to avoid misrepresentation.  
Finally, while funders tend to ask for the use of formal social impact measurement, a friction 
arises because it is not obvious which methods would be their preferred ones. Different stakeholders 
may prefer different measures (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). Social impact measurement is a 
burgeoning field, but it is full of alternatives and still in the process of developing conventions and 
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standards (Kroeger & Weber, 2014; McLoughlin et al., 2009; Rourke, 2014). Foundational research 
has developed methods to use economic or financial techniques to convert impacts into quantitative 
formats, such as contingent, stated and revealed preferences (Carson & Hanemann, 2005; Haab & 
McConnell, 2002; Hanemann, 1994), estimations of decision utility (Dolan & Kahneman, 2008; 
Kroeger & Weber, 2014), and ‘willingness to pay’ or ‘willingness to accept’ (Adamowicz, Louviere, 
& Williams, 1994). Besides, there are many methods to value social and environmental impact 
(Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Hubbard, 2009; Olsen & Galimidi, 2008), including modified versions of 
conventional business tools, such as Social Return on Investment (SROI) (Haab & McConnell, 2002; 
Millar & Hall, 2013). Other methods use customized measures for specific types of impact, including 
indexes and scorecards such as the Grameen Foundation’s ‘Progress out of Poverty Index’ (Toohig, 
2007) or the Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) catalogue of impact measurement 
metrics. Some methods focus less on the outcomes achieved, but rather on the efficiency and validity 
of the activities a social enterprise performs to generate social impact. These include methods based 
on logic models and theories of change (Rogers et al., 2000; 2006), participatory appraisals 
(Chambers, 1994), social accounting and audit (Gray, 2001), and popular charity comparison tools 
which compare an organization’s use of funds for program delivery versus overhead and fundraising 
expenses. Finally, experimental methods (e.g. randomized control trials) have been employed to 
assess outcomes and impacts of interventions (Banerjee, Banerjee, & Duflo, 2011). This variety of 
methodologies can lead to a paradox of choice for individual stakeholders and friction among them in 
deciding which method to use (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). Moreover, there will be different motives 
behind stakeholders’ preferences for particular methodologies: e.g., gaining insight to improve 
operations, choosing which organizations to fund in order to optimize the return on a social 
investment portfolio (Frumkin, 2003; Nicholls, 2009), creating a symbolic object designed to establish 
legitimacy (Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Nicholls, 2009; Power, 2003), or 
promoting one’s own reputation (Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011). 
 Taken together, then, the ambiguity of social impact and its measurement in terms of the 
definition, the logic of the chain leading from inputs to impacts, the translation of complex 
interventions into parsimonious accounts, and the many methodologies available is a double-edged 
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sword. On one hand, the ambiguity creates frictions between the multiple stakeholders involved. 
Given these frictions, the social entrepreneurs may find that implementing formal methodologies 
limits rather than improves their ability to measure social impact by predefining what data should be 
used, assuming a causal logic that seems questionable, defining social impact in ways misaligned with 
their own views, or recommending actions that take them away from their mission (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim et al., 2014). On the other hand, the ambiguity gives social entrepreneurs a 
considerable degree of interpretive flexibility (Nicholls, 2009). This flexibility, however, may only 
extend to ways of measuring social impact that are seen as compatible with the rationalization and 
marketization of the social sector (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004), such as those 
that borrow performance measurement and reporting practices from accounting and finance (Brest et 
al., 2012; Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Nicholls, 2009; Rourke, 2014). Thus, social entrepreneurs still 
need to achieve some autonomy in how they approach social impact measurement in order to 
construct measures that reflect their understandings and stay true to their social mission (Lumpkin, 
Moss, Gras, Kato, & Amezcua, 2013). To better understand how social entrepreneurs contend with 
this interpretive flexibility inherent in social impact measurement (Nicholls, 2009), we employ a 
bricolage lens (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-Strauss, 1962). 
 
3. A Bricolage Approach to Social Impact Measurement 
Bricolage takes a social constructionist view of an organization’s environment (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). It emphasizes that entrepreneurs do not simply accept the limitations set upon them but 
instead show critical agency in enacting their environment (cf. Weick, 1988). Extant work on 
bricolage in entrepreneurship focuses on the enactment of resource environments, asking how it is 
possible that some entrepreneurs are able to create something out of nothing (Baker, 2007; Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; Di Domenico et al., 2010). Social entrepreneurs (and nonprofits more generally) have 
been identified as resorting to bricolage for resource acquisition to reduce costs or their dependence 
on others (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Gras & Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Mair & Marti, 2009). Following 
previous work on social entrepreneurship (Desa & Basu, 2013; Mair & Marti, 2009), we make a 
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distinction between material and ideational bricolage that Lévi-Strauss (1962) already suggested in his 
original work (Baker, 2007).  
Material bricolage refers to the ‘process through which people use and combine the various 
resources they have “at hand” as a means of finding workable–if typically imperfect–approaches to a 
wide variety of problems and opportunities’ (Baker, 2007: 697). Studies on material bricolage show 
how traditional goal-based approaches to product design – whereby firms design a product and then 
seek the most advantageous resources to construct it – often failed as the costs of acquiring the 
material resources needed to properly construct it outstrip the value it may generate (Baker & Nelson, 
2005; Garud & Karnøe, 2003). Social enterprises are known to rely on material bricolage, as they are 
frequently observed forsaking the goal of creating a specific product and focusing instead on creating 
whatever product is possible using at-hand resources (Desa & Basu, 2013; Di Domenico et al., 2010). 
Social impact measurement also has a material level, as it relies on the collection of data about 
outcomes and impact of social interventions. Social entrepreneurs are likely to use bricolage for this 
purpose, and thus resort to using imperfect data, because their activities in poorly functioning or 
underserved markets makes data collection a significant challenge (Di Domenico et al., 2010).  
We argue that social impact measurement also has an ideational level. Ideational bricolage 
refers to the process by which organizations ‘recombine elements of older myths to create new myths 
serving new functions’ (Baker, 2007: 697). Mair and Marti’s (2009) study shows, for example, how 
social entrepreneurs ‘made-do’ with customs and religious beliefs that were prevalent in the local 
environment. By borrowing and repurposing these existing customs and beliefs, the entrepreneurs 
ensured that local stakeholders accepted their activities to reduce poverty. Through an ideational 
bricolage lens, social impact measurement is seen as an ideational product that does not in itself create 
value, but helps social entrepreneurs and stakeholders understand the value created. It thus fits the 
view of social impact as being socially constructed (Nicholls, 2009; Paton, 2003). Ontologically, 
social impact is constructed both cognitively by each social entrepreneur and stakeholder individually 
and socially through a negotiation amongst them. As Paton (2003: 5) contends, ‘for social enterprises 
(particularly) performance is not some underlying attribute that exists and can be known 
independently of the people centrally involved in and concerned about that organization. Performance 
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is what those people more or less agree, implicitly or explicitly, to be performance, what they have in 
mind when they use the term.’ Ideational bricolage implies that social entrepreneurs have the 
autonomy to cognitively construct and reconstruct social impact to be accountable to multiple 
stakeholders with disparate expectations and understandings of the social enterprise. As the different 
stakeholders’ expectations tend to be incongruent, social entrepreneurs will have to negotiate amongst 
them to achieve consensus on how and what to measure, or make strategic decisions which 
stakeholders to appease and disappoint (Nicholls, 2009). Hence, to stay true to their social mission 
(Lumpkin et al., 2013), social entrepreneurs face the challenge of finding ways to recombine elements 
of what social impact means that derive from or resonate with the methodologies for social impact 
measurement available to them (cf. Carstensen, 2011). 
Overall, it is clear from the existing literature on social impact measurement that applying 
formal methodologies can be challenging as there are many frictions between social enterprises and 
stakeholders regarding how to measure social impact (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Nicholls, 2009). 
Despite Nicholls’ (2009) first efforts in conceptualizing social impact measurement as bricolage, 
much remains to be understood about the actual process of bricolage in this context. It is not clear 
how social entrepreneurs use and combine material and ideational bricolage; how they bricolage 
multiple ideas together that might be in tension with each other; and how bricolage functions to 
legitimate the way social entrepreneurs create social accounts. In the remainder of the paper, we 
examine these issues in more detail based on interviews with social entrepreneurs active in small-to-
medium-sized organizations.  
 
4. Data and Methods 
Our aim is to study the approaches social entrepreneurs take to engage the frictions inherent 
in accounting for social impact. As such, a qualitative, inductive methodology best lends itself to our 
questions (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Responses to frictions would be strongest and clearest in 
situations where the frictions themselves are strongest and most central within an organization. Social 
enterprises fit this description particularly well. Their hybrid organizational form is a well-noted 
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nexus of frictions in the accountability practices, priorities, and conventions between their market and 
non-market sides (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Further, those working in base-of-the-pyramid and 
economically developing environments frequently face tensions between the developing environments 
where the beneficiaries of their operations reside and the developed environments where their funding 
comes from. This leads to or exacerbates a host of tensions related to culture, geography, technology, 
communication challenges, and tensions within the wicked problems they are attacking themselves.  
We investigated the accountability practices of 22 social enterprises whose primary mission 
was to aid the extremely poor in developing countries and who all used market-based funding 
mechanisms to start and grow their enterprise. Since our goal was to look at an enterprise’s ways of 
engaging and responding to the frictions inherent in social impact measurement, we also wanted to 
focus on periods in their lifecycle when they were initially forming their responses to these frictions. 
This meant looking at relatively newer firms that were either starting up or searching for their first 
round of scaling-up funding. These enterprises were having to create and revise their responses to new 
stakeholders and were in the process of developing and refining their social impact measurement. 
While larger and more experienced firms had more net experience, they were more temporally distant 
from the periods when their social impact measurements were originally developed. To gain 
additional perspective and to triangulate the data from the social enterprises, one additional interview 
was carried out with an impact investment firm that specializes in funding social enterprises. In total 
we conducted 23 interviews, but in some interviews there was more than interviewee present.   
After a small initial group of social enterprises was found through internet searches and 
personal networks, subsequent ones were approached iteratively in relation to the emerging 
dimensions of our data (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis, & Harris, 1992). For 
example, certain early interviews suggested that entrepreneurs working in rural areas might need to 
approach their social impact accounts differently because of the more transient, isolated, and insular 
nature of many of their beneficiaries. We then sought out additional social entrepreneurs for inclusion 
in our study to ensure we ‘filled out’ and achieved representative coverage (Coyne, 1997; 
Sandelowski, 1995) of both sides of this urban vs. rural setting dimension. In this approach, 
theoretical sampling selection cannot be predetermined in advance and instead emerges to ‘lead the 
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researcher to more sampling in particular dimensions’ (Coyne, 1997: 624; Schatzman & Strauss, 
1973). Our iterations ultimately resulted in several theoretically relevant categories: geographical 
region, urban vs. rural setting, industry, founders’ country of origin, organizational status, and basic 
business model. Our focus, however, was on seeking common patterns that might fit across both sides 
of these dimensions to understand ‘how diverse factors configure as a whole’ (Sandelowski, 1995: 
182), since these can be generalized into universal theoretical models and can build propositions for 
testing in future studies (Yin, 2003). Table 1 details the social enterprises that were interviewed. 
----------------------------------------	
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 We began by interviewing one or two members of each enterprise, usually a founder and/or 
key employee who reported to the founder, via phone or internet video calls. A semi-structured format 
was used, starting with a standard list of questions to probe the enterprise’s social impact measures, 
how those measures arose, key challenges or issues they experienced, key insights or benefits that 
they gained from accomplishing the measurement, and the roles and demands of internal and external 
constituencies in shaping the impact measures. On average, interviews lasted approximately 1 hour. 
Additionally, we collected current and archival secondary data for each enterprise regarding the social 
impact accounts they created, including: website materials, impact reports/statements, annual reports, 
business plans, newspaper clippings, white papers/other documents they have published related to 
impact, posted interviews, other marketing documents, and Facebook wall posts. These documents 
added rich details to social impact accounts, giving evidence of how social impact accounts were 
ultimately created, and allowed comparisons with the interview data.  
Once completed, the interviews were transcribed and analyzed using Atlas.ti 7, and, later, 
Nvivo10 software. We began coding inductively, using first-order, in vivo codes based on concepts 
and themes expressed directly in the statements of the interviewees (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Van 
Maanen, 1979). Several hundred codes arose from this initial coding due to its granular and 
descriptive nature. These codes did not have clear conceptual boundaries between them, and so an 
initial process of consolidating and refining codes occurred. Codes that did not have a clear initial 
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relation to social impact measurement were temporarily set aside. This reduced the number of 
working codes to around 170. Next, a fuller thematic analysis was performed to uncover second- and 
third-order linkages, commonalities, and more general, aggregate themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; 
Van Maanen, 1979). Coding was mainly performed by one author, with the second author reviewing 
the coding for reasonableness and logic, while also acting as a devil’s advocate and a sounding board. 
Codes and themes were reviewed and adjusted until agreement among authors was achieved.  
As we analyzed our data, one foundational observation emerged that seemed to underlie much 
of the social entrepreneur’s thinking about impact measurement: while social entrepreneurs were 
exposed to, and had sometimes attempted to some degree, many of the formal methodologies to 
measure social impact, social entrepreneurs almost never committed entirely to a specific 
methodology. Instead, social impact measurement was frequently more akin to a patchwork 
combination of elements from multiple methodologies. There were exceptions, as discussed in the 
findings, but once this general recognition was made, the preponderance of the rest of the codes 
organized into topics related to the thinking behind the social entrepreneurs’ choices to create their 
own accounts of social impact rather than entirely commit to more formal methodologies. Built into 
their thinking, and the codes, were the inverse themes delegitimizing the reasons to pursue formal 
methods and legitimizing their alternative approach. All transcripts were then iteratively revisited, 
paying special attention to these themes, ensuring that all aspects had been captured and were 
understood. Figure 1 details the progression from first-order coding to second-level themes (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013), which then produce our aggregate understanding of how and why social 
enterprises delegitimized formal approaches to social impact measurement. 
----------------------------------------------------	
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
5. Findings 
5.1 Reflexive accountability through formal social impact measurement 
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Our interviews suggested that the social entrepreneurs in our sample were not consistently 
implementing any form of formal social impact measurement. Extant methodologies (e.g. SROI, logic 
models, or experimental methods) were essentially unused among social entrepreneurs in the small-to-
medium sized enterprises that we interviewed. Only two of the twenty-two enterprises systematically 
used a formal methodology to understand their social impact. Five enterprises performed pilot testing 
or clinical trials to understand their product’s performance and nine attempted some sort of survey, 
formal or informal, to gather baseline data. However, even when such data was collected, social 
entrepreneurs did not collect surveys both before and after the intervention to create structured pre- 
and post- intervention comparisons. Formal surveying was abandoned due to the high resource 
demands and limited applicability. Survey data that was collected was not processed into usable 
results using any type of formal methodology. Finally, when practices resembling a formal 
methodology were used, most interviewees, save those performing formalized engineering testing or 
medical clinical trials, readily admitted that their methods were inventions of convenience and 
imagination without any formal basis. The exceptions arose when the enterprise received funding 
from aid organizations or governments specifically demanding to evaluate impact in a specific 
manner; when the enterprise was developing medical devices that required specific proof of safety 
and effectiveness; or when a member of the enterprise’s team had previously done impact 
measurement for another, larger organization. 
We found that this absence of using existing methodologies was neither due to a lack of 
external stakeholder pressure, nor a lack of desire of the entrepreneurs. The interviewees explained 
that funders were interested in having formal measurements. While they might suggest specific 
methodologies, funders did not express a strong preference for the specific framework behind the 
impact measures, though, so long as it was perceived as sufficiently objective and evidence-based. 
Only the largest institutional and governmental funders requested specific units of measure or 
methodologies. All other funders seemed satisfied with the measures the social entrepreneurs had 
devised themselves. One social entrepreneur commented: 
I think they just want to know where the money goes. No, we haven't really 
had anyone say, “We really want to have this specific metric met.” Now, 
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that's not going to happen in the future. I just haven't encountered it thus far.  
While the social enterprises were subject to pressure to demonstrate their impact with evidence, they 
were still largely free to choose how. Yet, we also found that social entrepreneurs avoided existing 
methodologies. Instead, they frequently resorted to creating improvised collections of simple, ad hoc, 
self-generated methods, bricolaged together from at-hand data, experiential anecdotes, insights 
collected through encountered academic articles and collective industry wisdom from industry players 
(see section 5.3 below).  
Several recurrent themes arose from the informants about the frictions that led them to 
eschew formal methods for social impact measurement. These ranged from concerns over 
counterproductive consequences of collecting impact data to those over the ability of impact 
measurement to accurately and sufficiently capture their social impact. These concerns were amplified 
by the challenges of implementing impact measurements and putting them into a comparable and 
contextualized format. The main arguments behind these sentiments are detailed in the following 
sections and summarized in Figure 1. Social entrepreneurs used these sentiments to critically engage 
with the formal social impact measurements they either encountered or that were suggested to them as 
ways to account for their social impact. Their critique not only highlighted several key concerns, but 
these concerns were employed to enable their use of an alternative, bricolage approach to constructing 
impact measurements that would better serve their needs and interests.  
5.2 Delegitimizing formal methodologies for social impact measurement  
 
5.2.1 Social impact measurement as immeasurable 
A first critique employed to delegitimize social impact measurement methodologies was how 
social entrepreneurs portrayed social impact as immeasurable – both for them specifically and, more 
generally, for anyone. They frequently discussed how they lacked the capabilities and background to 
perform such measurements. Their previous education and experience either did not expose them to 
methodologies for social impact measurement at all or at a level that would only remotely allow their 
use. For many of the social entrepreneurs, most aspects of business started as a blank slate:  
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When you first foray in to this kind of market, everything is unknown and 
there is nobody to advise you. […] Who are the stakeholders? Who’s 
present? What’s been done in the past? How has that worked? Has it worked 
or failed? All of these questions are a complete blank sheet of paper. You 
have nothing to go on that’s been before.  
This lack of exposure prompted entrepreneurs to search for existing resources. Many had engineering 
backgrounds and lamented how engineering programs lacked instruction in the business aspects they 
were dealing with, including impact measurement. They mentioned performing searches on the 
internet, discussing with partners or other social entrepreneurs who were also struggling with the same 
issues, and looking at case studies and academic articles. For those who searched heavily for impact 
measurement resources, the issue was never that they could not discover the existence of these 
methods; it was that they often did not have sufficient support and resources to implement them. 
Thus, even for those who actively sought out existing methodologies, these served as inspiration but 
were never formally implemented. 
Besides, while funders demanded data and reporting, they rarely provided guidance or 
opinions on what needed to be collected or how to collect it. Funders either felt this was the 
responsibility of social entrepreneurs or lacked these capabilities themselves (Ebrahim & Rangan, 
2014). Social entrepreneurs also did not find existing industry standards or templates to follow. The 
examples they could gather from other social entrepreneurs tended to be very basic, specific to a 
particular organization, or tied to a particular funding source. This lack of standards led social 
entrepreneurs to construct measures that seemed relevant and appropriate to them, but also left many 
feeling quite uncomfortable with their metrics and not optimistic that better metrics were forthcoming. 
As one entrepreneur said: 
I think another challenging aspect of, say, the clean cook-stove space, is that 
there aren’t a lot of standards to compare against across geographies or 
across technologies. And I think that most of that implementing 
organizations or the product developers or manufacturers don’t have the 
knowledge or the ability to assess these things.  
Many stated that they would have appreciated greater guidance from their industry or from funders. 
Social entrepreneurs felt that neither they nor their funders had enough first-hand experience to 
generate projections that would hold up to scrutiny. Consequently, many enterprises delayed 
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implementing any type of impact measurement, or relied solely on anecdotal evidence to account for 
their impacts: ‘Yeah, I would say “sense” is probably a good word for right now because that’s really 
the level that we’re approaching the work.’  
More generally, social entrepreneurs questioned whether it was even possible to generate 
accurate data. One issue that social entrepreneurs mentioned as a limiting factor for impact 
measurement was that the underlying data upon which metrics were built were inevitably unreliable 
and inaccurate. Many beneficiaries lived remotely or frequently moved, making it hard to locate and 
then reach participants to follow-up with them. Beneficiaries frequently could not be contacted 
without visiting them in-person. In many parts of the world, female beneficiaries were not permitted 
to talk to unrelated males without their husbands or another male relative present. Yet, these males 
were frequently away working for extended periods of time. Several entrepreneurs mentioned how 
gender and cultural norms also caused inaccuracies even when they could be reached. For instance, 
the presence of male family members was felt to bias and limit females’ responses.  Pride also played 
a role, generally causing beneficiaries to downplay the impact that an intervention had. For 
interventions that provided income or livelihoods to females, for example, entrepreneurs found that 
impact was downplayed or not acknowledged for fear of causing jealousy and resentment in male 
family members toward female income-earners. As one social entrepreneur mentioned: “[…] and 
there’s the whole issue around ‘my wife is making more money than me.’ That is kind of frowned 
upon.” Discussing the impact of improvements derived from female income or products that primarily 
helped females could also bring shame and resentment to a family by implying that that a father or 
husband could not fully provide for the family. As another entrepreneur elaborated: 
See, the thing is, all these things sometimes are also difficult to assess. This 
is something we can only guess at. Why? […] People won’t even 
acknowledge that their daughter's earning has made a difference for their 
household. For only some actually come out and say, well, you know that 
she has contributed to her brother's marriage or her wedding. 
Conversely, and irrespective of gender, beneficiaries were suspected of withholding negative 
information or sugarcoating responses because they did not want to damage their relationship with a 
potential resource. 
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5.2.2 Social impact measurement as imprudent 
A second theme related to delegitimizing extant formal methodologies for social impact 
measurement was the cost and effort of gathering the additional data required for these 
methodologies. Implementing these methodologies was seen as an imprudent investment. While 
social entrepreneurs were motivated to measure social impact, they found that the demands of running 
their enterprise precluded them from dedicating time and money to such endeavors. For the emerging 
social entrepreneur, having impact was essential, but demonstrating impact was viewed as a burden 
on their time and resources. Social entrepreneurs instead focused more on providing details of impact 
as economically as possible to avoid distracting themselves from their goal of creating impact in the 
first place. As one entrepreneur stated: 
One of the challenges as a startup social enterprise is that, it's not like we 
have a huge budget to invest in doing research. That's not our job. And so 
any research and data collection that we do has to be incorporated into our 
regular course of doing business. 
Social entrepreneurs valued at-hand data, usually pre-existing marketing, design, or 
operational data, as the information upon which to build impact evaluations for its virtue of being free 
and not demanding additional time to collect. Attempting more formal methodologies often required 
additional data in order to adequately trace the causality of the changes in the situations of their 
beneficiaries. This data required time and effort to collect, e.g. via additional surveying or monitoring 
of the beneficiaries. Further, gaining sufficient data to ensure the validity of formal methodologies 
risked becoming quite significant investments – often requiring additional data both before and after 
an intervention, potentially on a large scale and over a long timeframe. Thus, the data required to 
adequately measure social impact seemed to far outstrip any slack resources at an enterprise’s 
disposal. Unless external support was provided, impact measurement never became a sufficient 
priority compared to other demands on the enterprise. One social entrepreneur elaborated: 
But no, we don't have a good sense and we're trying to figure out a way to 
monitor that. That's one of the challenges of being a social enterprise or 
social business is that first and foremost, we have to make sure that the 
business is working and that we're going to survive and that we're going to 
be able to continue operating. Figuring out how to measure impact, and 
when, is a secondary priority. 
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Beyond the direct costs of trying to measure impact, additional indirect costs arose. Some 
social entrepreneurs reported that the process of collecting impact data caused their clients to change 
opinion about the goals of the social enterprise in ways that harmed their business. When social 
entrepreneurs surveyed clients to collect impact data, these were likely to interpret the surveys to 
mean that the social enterprise was actually equivalent to a non-profit. Social entrepreneurs suggested 
that their clients had never before experienced for-profits measuring impact; only non-profits seemed 
to do that. For the social entrepreneurs, performing surveys was risky because it could make their 
clients view them as non-profit organizations rather than as businesses, which made pricing their 
products or services more difficult. Clients’ previous experience with non-profits was that non-profits 
either eventually gave products and services away for free or only charged a below-market token 
price. The social entrepreneurs worried that a perception of being similar to a non-profit would 
undercut their ability to set prices at remunerative rates.  
Social entrepreneurs also emphasized that the costs of measuring data are born not only by 
those collecting it, but also by beneficiaries that have to provide the data. For the beneficiaries, 
providing data can be significant and negatively affect their livelihoods. Thus, the overhead costs of 
impact measurement imposed on an intervention’s beneficiaries can counteract and diminish the net 
amount of impact generated. Some organizations chose to limit impact measurement to reduce the 
burden of collection, not on them, but on their beneficiaries. One enterprise described an extreme 
case: 
We've had people who've come in and said, please call the women to the 
road head because I am not capable of walking. I do not wish to walk that 
one hour that it will take me to reach the village and talk to them there, so 
the women have to leave whatever they're doing, milking the cow or cutting 
the grass, and come and meet this great gentleman who has arrived from this 
one funding organization because he cannot be bothered to take the trouble. 
We refused to work with them, actually.  
Thus, despite whatever value was to be gained from the collecting data that may lead to better 
decision-making, the costs in time, resources, and opportunity were often considered as an imprudent 
investment.  
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5.2.3 Social impact measurement as incomplete  
The third theme related to delegitimization that emerged from our analysis was that social 
entrepreneurs found that even if/when data could be accurately obtained, social impact data was 
fundamentally incomplete and could not capture the full import and complexity of their social impact. 
The insights social impact measurements generated and the conclusions they recommended were thus 
perceived as distorted and invalid. Metrics and measures were generally not considered being 
reflective of the situation on the ground. Part of the issue for social entrepreneurs was that metrics 
reduce the complexity and interconnectedness of their work. One entrepreneur explained how ‘the 
parameters often themselves are not a good definition of how to evaluate. […] Because the metric is 
trying to evaluate something intangible, so the metric is putting it into a structure, which is actually 
not possible.’ Others talked about how there were too many factors at play, and metrics did not 
capture many of the relevant issues and ignored confounding or co-varying factors. Data could not 
reflect the complexity of the lives of the people they served and the environments they operated 
within. Social entrepreneurs discussed the multifaceted nature of the problems they and their 
beneficiaries faced. They were well aware of being just one small actor among many in a manifold 
and convoluted ecosystem. Trying to interpret their specific impact in isolation, or even reliably 
attributing causality from their specific outputs to broader changes in their environments was seen as 
an oversimplification of the dynamics and complexity of their environment. A persistent sense was 
that any sort of metric simply could not express enough detail to illuminate what was actually 
happening.  
 Social entrepreneurs argued that the effect of putting data into metric-based formats was that 
assessments inevitably either over- or under-estimated the importance of various factors and 
phenomena. Social enterprises that focused on more intensive, deeper solutions to poverty were 
frustrated, for instance, in how much weight and focus was put on the number of people helped, 
regardless of how significant the help provided was. A social enterprise that focused on housing found 
it very difficult to obtain funding due to the relatively small number of people affected, despite the 
substantial improvement provided to each person. The sheer number of people helped was frequently 
mentioned as a preeminent concern for stakeholders, regardless of the impact per person. Others 
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mentioned how the impact measurements facilitated an over-emphasis on short-term over longer-term 
outcomes.  
Timing was an issue because the timeframe required to make accurate assessments was quite 
long – generally years – and far longer than a social enterprise’s timeframe to attract funding to 
operate and scale. They often needed to generate evaluations of impact to secure funding to operate 
and grow well before they felt the results of their operations had a chance to unfold. Social 
entrepreneurs detailed how they had to rely on a bevy of assumptions and projections to create pro 
forma impact measurements. Given the challenging environment, these assumptions were considered 
suspect and easily skewed. The social entrepreneurs explained how their practices, assumptions, and 
expectations were in a constant state of flux, as they continued to learn about their beneficiaries and 
environments. Even when social entrepreneurs had the opportunity to study impact over extended 
timeframes, they discussed how formal methods were impaired by environmental and cultural factors 
that led to low response rates, sample biases, and unreliable data. The settings they operated in simply 
did not allow for sufficiently complete or long-term tracking. 
Several social entrepreneurs observed that oftentimes impact was generated for beneficiaries 
by preventing future costs or negative experiences, rather than improving their lives directly. 
Assessing these impacts imposes an even higher challenge, because impact would then need to be 
calculated by comparing beneficiaries’ lives not against what did happen, but against what might have 
happened in a counterfactual world, absent the intervention. Particularly in tight-knit communities, 
improving an individual’s outcomes often led to positive outcomes not only for that individual, but 
also for extended families, neighbors, and the larger community. The amount of impact detected could 
vary wildly based on where a social evaluation placed the artificial boundary of how far out to trace 
the ripples of an intervention. Likewise, many interventions also aimed to help an entire village or 
region, creating outcomes for communities beyond specific individuals. In these cases, the impact to 
entire communities or geographic regions needed appraisal, thus further expanding the complexity of 
impact measurement (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014). 
Another common topic throughout the interviews was that funders and other stakeholders 
never actually visited the locations where the social enterprises operate. While impact measurements 
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provided portable proxies for social impact, they also enabled key stakeholders to forsake actually 
visiting and observing the social enterprise and its environment. Without seeing the operation first-
hand, most stakeholders failed to gain experience with the relevant context to truly understand the 
operation’s details or to have their preconceptions and assumptions challenged. Social impact data 
was regretted by social entrepreneurs as a poor substitute for taking the time and effort to visit and 
gain an understanding of the operations in their local environment. Social impact measurements were 
also felt to reflect and reinforce Western cultural norms and preconceptions held by stakeholders 
rather than illuminate what was happening within the local environment the social entrepreneurs were 
working in. One social entrepreneur asked: 
For example, how do you measure if a woman is empowered or not? […] A 
village woman, for example, is expected to show her involvement in a very 
defined way, which is how an external factor would evaluate this as saying 
that, yes, in the community, all the women this organization is working with, 
are empowered because they behave in XYZ ways, one of which is a very, 
very vocal expression. For me, I find that kind of parameter very difficult to 
understand, because a woman in the mountains is empowered already, you 
know? She is the one who takes the burden of the society and runs this 
whole society here in the mountains, because the men don't work really. It's 
the women who are taking care of everything. So who am I to put a 
definition to her empowerment and for her to prove it to me? 
Even with the best intentions of both parties, social entrepreneurs described how culturally influenced 
assumptions and preconceptions inevitably seeped into impact measurements, defining success 
according to Western norms and values. A similar concern arose when social impact measurements 
that had been created for much wealthier societies were adapted to use in extreme-poverty 
environments. Social entrepreneurs noted how this created measures laden with unworkable 
assumptions: 
Questions around like, how many vehicles do you have? What group 
structure do you have? Like X, Y and Z type of thing. Some of them are kind 
of funny, because it’s like, well, if you had any vehicle at all you almost 
wouldn’t be asking the questions here. Some of the guys I work with laugh 
at them, not everything translates always here.  
Another critique of formal methodologies is that they stripped out intuitive and emotional 
information. The entrepreneurs quite frequently found that non-rational and affective information 
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played a strong role in stakeholder decision-making. Such information was felt to provide inspiration 
and motivation to act. Further, they described ‘just knowing’ impact, or that their claims made 
‘intuitive sense’ even outside having details to substantiate. References to ‘gut feelings,’ ‘instinct,’ 
‘blind trust,’ and intuition were prevalent as social entrepreneurs discussed how they knew the amount 
of impact they were having. Here, they appealed to how their knowledge of impact was embedded 
within the experiences and anecdotes they shared, i.e. their ‘expert’s intuition.’ Such applications of 
expert intuition in decision-making have a well-established place in strategic management and have 
been noted as particularly useful and comparatively accurate in situations characterized by high 
uncertainty and a lack of available information (Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse, & Figge, 2014; Jarzabkowski, 
Lê, & Van de Ven, 2013). As one social entrepreneur commented, data ‘doesn’t really matter. The 
story is really what sells it, I think. And the story was conveyed with atypical information not usually 
included in impact measurements – images, anecdotes, intuitive senses, social media interactions, and 
affective reactions. People really understand that they accept the story, and I think that’s a big draw.’ 
Or, as another put it: 
There are the SROI calculations and all that stuff that could come into it, but 
from what I’ve seen on a day-to-day basis or even from the feedback that we 
got from people that are there and doing that is that yes, that stuff is 
theoretical but at the end of the day there’s also a gut feeling that goes with 
certain products and also goes with how you envision the entrepreneur and 
the organization or that what the organization is creating and what sort of 
faith you have in that in terms of momentum that’s building too. 
5.2.4 Social impact measurement as irrelevant 
Even when impact assessments were created, a final theme related to delegitimization that 
social impact measurement provided little-to-no actionable insights. Social entrepreneurs thus 
considered social impact measurement as irrelevant. Even as progress was observed in some 
measurable way, there was generally no baseline or broader context to compare this progress against. 
Social enterprises could not objectively determine if the numbers represented marginal or 
groundbreaking success. Units of measure across projects were not consistent, and even when they 
were, social entrepreneurs pointed out that the environments – even village to village – represented 
different starting points and different levels of environmental munificence. This meant that even 
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equivalent outcomes did not represent equivalent achievements. While they had anecdotal evidence 
and intuitive judgments of their ventures’ success, translating these senses into comparable results 
was not possible. As one social entrepreneur concluded regarding attempts to quantify impact: 
‘They’re not really giving you, statistically speaking, significant information.’  
They particularly questioned whether the increased precision afforded by certain 
measurements would affect decision-making. The intuitive ‘gut feeling’ of impact, social 
entrepreneurs reflexively gained through experience, was generally argued to be sufficiently accurate. 
Finally, while funders wanted to see numbers, there was a sense that funders largely did not actually 
use these impact measurements strategically. Rather, the measurements had a more symbolic role 
signifying that the social enterprise was keeping stakeholders informed and updated, that it was 
thinking about impact systematically, and that it was transparent. Thus, the measurements themselves, 
and the validity of the methodology used, were considered less important. The creation of an impact 
measurement, then, was just as likely to be viewed as an artificial task done to appease funders as to 
be viewed as part of a program to gain usable insights:  
You always need to state SROI, the SROI, the return of investment. We 
really tried to calculate, and I mean we came up with some kind of number, 
but that was, basically, you could have skewed that number. No one had 
noticed, I think.  
5.3 A bricolage approach to social impact measurement 
Interestingly, our data did not suggest that social entrepreneurs used the four delegitimizing 
critiques to avoid social impact measurement. The social entrepreneurs largely agreed with the 
purpose and goals behind social impact measurement and expressed a strong belief that measuring 
impact in a formal manner was important. They frequently conveyed hope to be able to invest more 
resources in developing more trustworthy and useful evaluations in the future. What we originally 
mistook as a lack of methodology among the social entrepreneurs was actually a competing approach 
to evaluation that forsook strict adherence to formal methodologies that focused on tracing a causal 
logic for a form of impact measurement that emphasized the value of opportunistically collecting at-
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hand, experiential data and ideas that might prove useful. That is, they actively created an alternative 
set of bricolaged impact measurements. As one social entrepreneur noted: 
See, the thing is, we live here, right? We don't function remotely. We live 
and work in the same region, so our entire team is from this area, so the 
impact is not an external factor that you measure. It's something you can see. 
Using the current and archival secondary data collected for each enterprise, we analyzed how 
social enterprises put forth information about their social impact to their current and prospective 
stakeholders. We found a pattern whereby social enterprises demonstrated their social impact through 
ad-hoc combinations of at-hand operational, design, and sales data; experiential anecdotes; retained 
highlights of academic research that they encountered; emotionally resonant images, videos, and other 
‘bric-a-brac remains’ (Douglas, 1986: 67) of commonly accepted wisdom and assertions. Social 
entrepreneurs strategically chose which ideas about impact to include. For example, a social enterprise 
that focused on the deep impact of providing homes avoided defining impact in terms of scale. Table 
2 provides an overview of these at-hand elements.  
----------------------------------------	
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The bricolaged measurements differ from formal methodologies in several respects. First, in 
formal methodologies, some, but rarely all, of the information listed in Table 2 is required as input 
data to calculate impact. These methodologies generally employ rules and standards on the data they 
utilize, excluding, for example, data that is overly subjective, unverifiable, or not relevant for its 
calculation. We observed that social entrepreneurs’ bricolaged measurements rejected external 
limitations on what may serve as data, and included all at-hand information irrespective of the 
potential applicability or relevance to any pre-determined conceptions of social impact and its 
measurement. One social entrepreneur told funders: 
If you want to understand, you'd better find the time to understand. If you've 
taken the time to give us money, then you come and take the time and 
understand what we are doing. This is what the foundations need to learn, 
no? Organizations always don't have to dance because somebody has given 
them money to work. I think there need to be more and more people saying 
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no to this kind of way of functioning. Then it will change; because right 
now, it is foundations and investments that are driving it. There are a few 
people who are saying no, and the happy news is there are enough people 
who think like that, too, but a larger perspective that needs to change. 
 
Individual data was presented either in isolation, or adjacent to, but independent from each 
other. Accounts generally failed to attempt to formally posit any causal relationship between the 
individual elements or otherwise organize the elements into a causal chain. For example, impact was 
sometimes simply demonstrated through pictures of beneficiaries using a social enterprise’s products, 
accounts of satisfied customers, or copies of thank-you letters received. These were often combined 
with a detail about the performance features of the social enterprise’s product and a factoid about the 
number of people in a country or region that might be suffering from the need the social 
entrepreneur’s product addressed. If the product generated income or reduced expenses, the amount 
was always given, as was any time children were able to go to school, for example. However, how 
this information related to impact (or, sometimes even outcomes) was left to the imagination and 
common sense of the evaluator. 
Those making evaluations were expected to make-do with this information to draw their own 
(individual or collective) insights from the data. Accounts did not reconfigure the data into an 
overarching framework or causal chain, but simply made do with the intuitive conclusions that arose 
from these thematic collections of facts. Social entrepreneurs, when they were motivated to attempt 
collecting more formalized measures (either due to pressure or their own internal desire for greater 
rigor), bricolaged ideas for how to do this from pieces of formal methodologies they had encountered. 
A social entrepreneur described the process of trying to determine some measures to collect, and 
whether to invent their own or use a formal methodology as follows:  
Well, we do a little bit of both, but we definitely based them off of 
someone’s work … I mean, we’re very small, so being able to leverage 
resources that other people have created is very helpful in certain aspects, 
especially this kind of stuff. We have some stuff that we use that we pulled 
off of …It’s one of the big … It may be Acumen. Because, like I said, we 
modify them some, but they are based off of an established body of research, 
like an established way of doing that type of research and analysis. … It’s 
always a challenge with us, with the funding one, because doing those 
studies in a way that really is statistically significant is expensive, so yes, if 
we can leverage other people’s work in terms of at least having a 
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methodology for measuring that type of stuff, it helps. 
Overall, we found that social entrepreneurs were not deciding upon an existing method and 
then attempted to collect the relevant data necessary to implement that method. Instead, they started 
with the data they have at hand and bricolaged it together into thematic bundles to see what kind of 
ideas regarding impact might arise.  
Stakeholder power did significantly affect this process. Many large institutional and 
governmental funders have conditions for funding based on demonstrating impact in very specific 
ways. One interviewee shared her experience looking for additional growth funding via USAID. This 
funder requires social entrepreneurs to answer specific questions about their impact as part of the 
application and imposes the use of statistical analysis to quantify and then compare ‘impact per 
dollar.’ Because USAID is such a large and powerful funder, social enterprises that seek USAID 
funding must comply with such detailed methods for impact measurement. The social entrepreneur 
that found herself in this situation described her attempts to comply as much as possible. Still she 
expressed having little confidence in the numbers produced. As a result, some form of decoupling 
might be an issue in these cases (Bromley & Powell, 2012). For most social enterprises in our sample, 
however, much of the funding came from funders with whom they could exert some interpretive 
flexibility regarding what types of impact measurements to use.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
As noted in the introduction, the extant literature on social impact measurement highlights 
how the ambiguity around social impact and its measurement leads to frictions between the various 
different stakeholders involved in a social enterprise (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; 
Nicholls, 2009). Underlying these frictions is a conflict between what makes a social impact account 
valid and useful for stakeholders such as funders who operate from arm’s-length, as opposed to social 
entrepreneurs whose daily lived experiences provide them with information unavailable to others. 
These various positions relative to the data, as well as each group’s different interests, can cause 
frictions for what impact accounts are viewed as valid and useful.  
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6.1 Four lines of critique to delegitimize formal methodologies for social impact measurement  
This paper finds two interrelated mechanisms at play for how social entrepreneurs manage 
frictions amongst stakeholders regarding social impact measurement. First, social entrepreneurs use 
four lines of critique to delegitimize formal methodologies that involve evaluating the causal chain 
from inputs to impacts. Whenever social entrepreneurs sense that formal methodologies misrepresent 
or distract from their quest for social value creation or what they experientially know to work, they 
find important, social entrepreneurs attempt to resolve the tension by employing these four 
delegitimizing critiques aim to create voids of legitimacy in these methodologies – voids that provide 
social entrepreneurs the interpretive flexibility to blend in alternative forms of data and ideas. Second, 
bricolage is the mechanism social entrepreneurs use to fill the voids and create alternative accounts 
that fit their own understanding of social impact. 
----------------------------------------	
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
As seen in Figure 2, each of the four critiques reveals a different aspect of how social 
entrepreneurs’ delegitimize formal methodologies for social impact measurement. The lines of 
critique expose the social entrepreneur’s beliefs of what makes a good social account: i.e., validity 
(defined as the degree to which the data and underlying theory of the methodology correspond to the 
perceived reality of the social enterprise) and usefulness (defined as the degree to which the data and 
underlying theory of the methodology can guide decision-making). What makes a social account valid 
and useful is then considered at the material level (i.e., the nature and source of the data required for 
the methodology) and the ideational level (i.e., the theoretical logic underlying the methodology). 
Figure 2 shows how each form of delegitimization proffered by social entrepreneurs – i.e., 
immeasurable, imprudent, incomplete and irrelevant – focuses on highlighting a different purpose of 
social accounts that formal methodologies fail to meet in the social entrepreneurs’ perception. By 
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showing the data-related or theoretical voids in formal methodologies, the four critiques hinder the 
wholesale implementation of these methodologies and justify social entrepreneurs’ interpretive 
flexibility to fill these voids with data and theoretical elements that social entrepreneurs prefer. While 
Figure 2 presents material and ideational bricolage as separate levels, this is only done for analytical 
reasons, as the evidence suggested that both forms of bricolage are inextricably entwined and thus 
ontologically co-constitutive.  
At the material level, delegitimizing specific types of data used in formal methodologies 
enables ideational bricolage by impairing evaluators from committing wholesale to the methodologies 
that require such data. The immeasurable critique delegitimizes the data that formal methodologies 
require by arguing that the data is either inaccurate or impossible to obtain. The imprudent critique 
instead argues that the data collection is too costly in terms of resources and managerial attention, and 
that the process harms beneficiaries. Together, these two lines of critique challenge any methodology 
that depends on collecting highly prescribed data. In doing so, the social entrepreneurs create a void – 
i.e., a lack of data to construct impact accounts following formal methodologies – which grants them 
the flexibility to propose alternative social impact accounts that can be constructed with data available 
at hand. Criticizing formal methodologies on the material level thus supports ideational bricolage 
because the social entrepreneurs can only make do with at-hand data by developing their own 
constructed methodology for social impact measurement, bricolaged from ideas drawn from their own 
experience or from ideas salvaged from the delegitimized formal methodologies. 
At the ideational level, delegitimizing the specific theory underlying formal methodologies 
enables material bricolage by creating the interpretive flexibility to ignore limitations on what data 
can or cannot be used to measure social impact. The incomplete critique argues that the causal chain 
of formal methodologies does not do not represent the whole picture of a social intervention or all the 
confounding variables at play, and thus fails to create understanding of the full impact of the 
intervention. The irrelevant critique instead argues that the measures derived from a formal 
methodology are neither relevant nor usable to predict future success or guide which course of action 
a funder or social entrepreneur should take. Together, these two lines of critique challenge the causal 
chain of formal methodologies. In doing so, the social entrepreneurs create a void – i.e., a flawed 
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theoretical logic of formal methodologies – which grants them the flexibility to replace or add new 
theoretical elements which call for additional information from underutilized, undervalued, or 
discarded sources, particularly the experiential data social entrepreneurs value for its holistic view and 
practicality of use. Criticizing formal methodologies on the ideational level thus supports material 
bricolage because it allows social entrepreneurs to work around rules and standards of formal 
methodologies about what data can or cannot be used according to their underlying theory. 
Overall, the delegitimizing critiques we observed speak to many of the frictions that arise as 
social entrepreneurs critically develop social impact accounts that are valid and useful for 
stakeholders positioned both within and outside the enterprise’s operating environment. The lines of 
critique were in part used to serve social entrepreneurs prior to the choice and implementation of a 
methodology for social impact measurement in attempts to fend off formal methodologies, saving 
them from practices which they feared would waste effort and resources that could otherwise support 
value creation. However, we also observed these critiques being used during and after the evaluation 
to justify adjustments, to abandon impact measurement practices, or to manage evaluation results that 
failed to reflect their own understanding of social impact.  
6.2 Contribution to theory  
 While bricolage has been used before to explain social entrepreneurship (Desa & Basu, 
2013; Di Domenico et al., 2010; Mair & Marti, 2009), we make three main contributions to the 
literature that further develop bricolage in this field. Our first contribution is in underlining how 
ideational bricolage is an essential element of social impact measurement, and particularly how 
material and ideational bricolage work together in an intricate fashion. Our findings show how social 
enterprises used elements of material and ideational bricolage simultaneously for the practice of social 
impact measurement (cf. Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-Strauss, 1962; Mair & Marti, 2009). Many 
social entrepreneurs described how they hoped to satisfy themselves and their stakeholders with 
constructed accounts of their social impact that made-do with existing data. In doing so, they were 
primarily using elements of material bricolage by making do with the resources at hand (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). Simple availability became the main criterion for information to be included in the 
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construction of social impact accounts, refusing formal methodologies’ ideational limitations of what 
data was appropriate or not according to a priori theories of how to evaluate impact. If social 
entrepreneurs had information that they felt was important, the mere having of the information 
justified its inclusion because the information need not fit a formal methodology. This approach 
meant that the entrepreneurs allowed themselves to use previously underutilized, undervalued, or 
discarded sources of information (Desa & Basu, 2013). However, the only way the social 
entrepreneurs could make do with at-hand data was by constructing alternative methodologies for how 
to build data into accounts of social impact that used or accepted that data. The findings showed that 
much of the information used for a bricolaged approach to impact measurement was similar to what 
was needed for formal methodologies. By letting go of the need to follow the rules and standards of 
formal methodologies, the social entrepreneurs constructed new conceptions of what social impact 
means for them and how it can be measured. Hence, they dissected and repurposed existing ideas 
about social impact to create new ideas of social impact and evaluation that better fit their specific 
business and context (Carstensen, 2011). By using bricolaged methodologies that take advantage of 
underutilized, undervalued, or discarded sources of information, they were also able to develop more 
creative accounts of their social impact as they combined different types of information in novel ways 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Garud & Karnøe, 2003). This particularly came to the fore in the social 
entrepreneurs’ use of information of an experiential or intuitive nature, such as images and powerful 
anecdotes. By giving richer narratives a place in social impact measurement, ideational bricolage 
helped the social entrepreneurs blend their interpretations and priorities into the trend toward social 
impact measurement being more objective and evidence-based (see third contribution below).  
The second contribution that we make with this paper is in uncovering the integral role that 
delegitimization plays in the process of ideational bricolage. As Baker and Nelson (2005) argue, a 
fundamental aspect of bricolage in an entrepreneurial context is the refusal of the entrepreneur to see 
resource limitations as a constraint for entrepreneurial action. Formal methodologies, to the degree 
that they define specific rules and standards which integrate ideas of what data to collect and what 
ideas to use to interpret it, represent ideational and material limitations on the social entrepreneur’s 
social impact accounts. We argue that the ability to refuse these limitations specifically relies on a 
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process of delegitimizing the methodologies that create the limits. As integrated systems, formal 
methodologies are resistant to attempts to bricolage additional or substitute elements because these 
new elements do not have a prescribed place or role within the formal methodology’s theory of how 
to measure social impact. Ideational delegitimization shows how the formal methodology is actually 
flawed, thus creating voids of legitimacy within the integrated theory. These voids become the spaces 
in the integrated theory that bricolage can fill with the new data and ideas that otherwise would have 
no place in the system. Thus, delegitimization provides the interpretive flexibility needed to avoid 
simply accepting a formal methodology wholesale and instead demand that social entrepreneurs and 
funders search through the individual elements – the data and ideas – that the methodology has put 
together to see where the problem lies and bricolage a solution. Delegitimization atomizes the data 
and ideas within an integrated formal impact measurement system, breaking them free from their roles 
within the delegitimized methodology for use as elements to be bricolaged together, along with all the 
other at hand data and ideas about impact that never made it into the delegitimized methodology to 
begin with. The refusal to be limited by formal methodologies leads the entrepreneurs to critically 
enact their resource environment and thus potentially create something from nothing (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). 
Our third contribution is in providing a theoretical explanation for how bricolage serves as a 
critical response to the increased use of performance measurement and reporting constructions from 
accounting and finance as part of the rationalization and marketization of the social sector (Brest et 
al., 2012; Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Nicholls, 2009; Rourke, 2014). We 
argue that bricolage serves as a mechanism for social entrepreneurs to redirect social impact 
measurement away from simply borrowing from accounting and finance, toward creatively blending 
elements from these fields with the social entrepreneurs’ own ideas of impact rooted in their 
experience (Oswick et al., 2011). Formal methodologies represent a borrowing strategy as they mirror 
ideas from accounting and finance to create an objective measure and then systematize a combination 
of data and interpretive theory that traces a causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impacts 
(Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014; Frumkin, 2003; Roche, 1999). This causal chain follows the optimization 
logics of for-profit businesses (Desa & Basu, 2013), because it assumes that the more accurately a 
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method describes and measures the causal associations between inputs, outcomes and impact, the 
more optimally it measures impact. However, such borrowing from external theories wholesale seems 
to lead to the frictions discussed in the literature review, because these theories may not be fully 
appropriate to capture impact in the social sector. As Oswick and colleagues argue, the solution to 
such ‘problems will come from a shift from theory generation premised on a unidirectional process of 
borrowing to a two-way process of correspondence based on the notion of “conceptual blending”’ 
(2011: 318). Bricolage represents such blending, as it shows how social entrepreneurs take whatever 
they can from a formal methodology and see how it might be combined with other data and ideas into 
a new construction of social impact. Social entrepreneurs using bricolage use the same data and ideas 
that formal methodologies use (to the extent that they are at-hand), but instead of placing these in a 
causal chain, they simply create a collection of facts that are left for stakeholders to interpret. The data 
is positioned together but the overarching causal relationships are stripped away or left implicit. This 
switch from borrowing to blending counterbalances discussions how the imported ideas are similar 
and appropriate (‘i.e. of one-way borrowing based on analogical resonance’) with discussions how 
they are dissimilar and do not fit (i.e. ‘two-way blending based on analogical dissonance’) (Oswick et 
al., 2011: 318). The social entrepreneurs’ delegitimization critiques serve to create this dissonance and 
thus become the mechanisms to assist their interpretive flexibility. 
6.3 Implications, limitations, and future research 
While our research focused specifically on social enterprises, the practice of impact 
measurement is by no means exclusive to social entrepreneurs. For-profit entrepreneurs, for example, 
increasingly consider their broader impact on society, which implies that the topic of how to manage 
social impact measurement is becoming increasingly relevant as well. Indeed, social impact 
measurement is becoming more mainstream across a broad range of ventures that seek to improve the 
transparency and breadth of their existing performance measures by adding data about their impact on 
society (Zahra & Wright, 2016). Our theoretical insights based on entrepreneurs’ use of bricolage for 
accountability purposes thus extend beyond the field of social entrepreneurship alone into the broader 
realm of corporate accountability more generally. With broader notions of accountability, stretching 
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beyond financial performance, the degree of contestation of how to measure the impact of business on 
society will likely increase as well. That is, frictions between entrepreneurs and their stakeholders 
about the entrepreneurs’ impact on society will become more universal. Hence, future studies could 
build on our insights by examining in what way entrepreneurs primarily driven by a profit motive use 
bricolage to navigate these frictions. We would expect for-profit entrepreneurs to also face challenges 
with measuring their impact, but in different ways than social entrepreneurs due to their higher degree 
of familiarity with formal methodologies to measure performance. Hence, they might also partially 
delegitimize existing methodologies, but instead choose different elements to use in their bricolaged 
approaches. From a more practical perspective, our work can also serve to guide any organization 
attempting social impact measurement. Our work shows how a bricolage approach can be an effective 
way to reduce frictions amongst stakeholders that adhere to different ontologies and epistemologies 
regarding social impact and its measurement.  
Our exploratory study focuses its lens on social enterprises that were least likely to have 
available resources and capabilities to achieve objective measurements, because they were too small, 
too early in their development, or too resource-strapped. While looking at such cases can effectively 
magnify and highlight the frictions our work aimed to study, there may also be a lifecycle element in 
the types of methodologies social enterprises use as well as the motives behind using these. For 
earlier-stage social enterprises, more bricolaged approaches may be sufficient to be accountable to 
their stakeholders. Later in a social enterprise’s lifecycle, though, different methodologies or 
deligitimizations may become more prevalent as their resource base increases. Moreover, as social 
enterprises scale up they are likely to start depending more on the larger impact investors such as 
USAID that exert more pressure on them to use pre-specified methods to measure social impact. 
Thus, additional research is needed to fully understand how an enterprise’s size, age, and resources 
affect a social enterprise’s ability to meet stakeholder expectations regarding accountability for their 
social impact. 
As is the case in all interview-based methodologies, there is the risk of sample bias. Although 
we did not identify any factors that would lead to systematic biases, we acknowledge the distinct 
possibility that those social enterprises choosing to respond to our requests have different experiences 
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or viewpoints from those that chose not to. Larger and broader studies across a wider grouping of 
social enterprises could go a long way to answer these questions. Likewise, in our study we developed 
our sample based on variations across several dimensions and looked for social entrepreneurs’ 
commonalities and patterns in thinking about social impact measurement, despite their variation. 
While this approach is well established methodologically, it leaves unexplored why there are 
differences along the dimensions and the role those differences may play. A future study could 
develop additional insights by going more in-depth using a more homogenous sample. 
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Table 1 – Summary of Interviews 
  
Primary Product Interviewee Title Country Industry Founded Employees Location 
Founder 
Origin 
Profit or 
Non-Profit 
1. Textiles, Dyes Founder and Chairperson India Textiles 1996 N/A Rural Native Sustainable Nonprofit 
2. Water Delivery System Co-Founder and President Chile, US Water 2010 10 to 20 All Western For-Profit 
3. Straw Bale Housing Founder and CTO Pakistan Housing 2005 >5 Rural Western Sustainable Nonprofit 
4. Solar Cookers Co-Founder and CEO China Cooking 2007 10 to 20 Rural Western For-Profit 
5. Blood Transfusion Device Founder and CTO Ghana Medical 2011 >5 All Western For-Profit 
6. Handicrafts Founder and Creative Director Nigeria Handicrafts 2009 >5 All Dual Sustainable Nonprofit 
7. Heat Packs for Premature 
Infants Co-Founder and CEO 
India, Kenya, 
US Healthcare 2012 >5 All Western For-Profit 
8. Small Good Distribution Founder Mozambique, South Africa 
Distribution / Small 
Retail 2006 >5 All Dual For-Profit 
9. Fortified Rice Co-Founder and CEO Mali Food 2010 >5 Urban Native For-Profit 
10. Agricultural Products and 
Consultancy Communications Manager Multiple 
Agriculture, Water, 
Sanitation 1982* 100+* All Western Non-Profit 
11. Chocolate Co-founder and Managing Director,  2nd Managing Director Belize Food 2010 5 to 10 Rural Western For-Profit 
12. Social Investment Fund Senior Investment Manager Multiple Finance 1991 N/A All Western Non-Profit 
13. Solar Base Stations Co-Founder, Designer, and Strategist Tanzania Energy/Solar 2012 >5 Semi-Urban Western For-Profit 
14. Chocolate Founder and CEO Liberia Food 2004 >5 Rural Native For-Profit 
15. Sanitation Centers Community Partnership Officer Kenya Sanitation 2004 N/A Urban Native For-Profit 
16. LPG Distribution Founder and CEO Uganda Fuel 2008 5 to 10 Semi-Urban and Urban Native For-Profit 
17. Consultancy and 
 Business Incubation Co-Founder and Executive Director Multiple Multiple 2010 30 to 100 All Western Non-Profit 
18. Menstrual Cups Co-Founder Kenya Hygiene 2005 5 to 10 All Western For-Profit 
19. Solar Lamp and Charger Founder and Executive Director Tanzania Energy/Solar 2011 5 to 10 Rural, Semi-Urban Western For-Profit 
20. Electricity Solutions Business and Sustainable Development Manager Multiple Energy/Solar 2009* N/A* All Western For-Profit 
21. Motorcycle Taxis Co-Founder and CEO Uganda Transportation 2010 5 to 10 Urban Western For-Profit 
22. Home Insulation Co-Founder and CEO Pakistan Housing 2007 >5 Urban Native For-Profit 
* These social enterprises were new ventures within a larger organization.  
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• Measuring is difficult / measures require large studies 
• Impacts difficult because intangible rather than usual tangible 
• Measures require large studies  
• Testing is difficult - people don't know/say what they want 
• Social entrepreneurs don't have knowledge or ability to assess standards/measures 
• Business/sustainability skills not taught in college 
• Don't feel confident about measures 
• College support disappears at graduation 
• Onus on social organizations to measure 
• Many partners not real partners, just donors 
• Partners - need their help to measure 
• Even basic knowledge and research not understood by community groups 
Measurement 
difficult to do 
Do not know how 
to measure 
• Measurement numbers not accurate, but people do not notice 
• Measurement numbers not accurate, easily skewed 
• Culture issues / respondent pride prevents measurement accuracy  
• Couldn't interact with female clients because male relatives were not around 
• Measures do not obtain valid data 
• Testing is difficult - people do not  know/say what they want 
Data inputs are 
inaccurate 
           
Social impact 
measures as 
Immeasurable 
Partners  
can't/won’t help 
when needed 
• No preexisting stats 
• Often a blank slate/start with little or no info – all up to you 
• Experience over time is often only info source 
No prior research, 
examples, 
templates 
First-Level Categories Second Order Themes 
Aggregate 
Dimension 
• Collecting data costs money, is expensive - don't want to add to overhead 
• Don't have time/ money for studies 
• Measuring difficult because lack of access to computer/internet/processing power 
• Money is Tight 
• Collecting Data Costs Money is Expensive, Don't Want to Add to Overhead 
• Measuring Not Their Job, Not Where Want to Focus Time/Money, Lower Priority 
• Financing Difficult for Businesses Because Startup Costs Extra Big for SE’s 
Takes Resources 
Away from 
Growing Business 
• Measures - Ask Too Much and People Think They Are Part of an Experiment 
• Trials of Previous Iterations Can Cause Bad Word of Mouth for Future Versions 
• Prior Overhyped Products Leads to Bad Word of Mouth 
• Other’s Prior Projects Failures Affects Community Perceptions for Your Project 
Prohibitively 
Costly / Time 
Consuming 
Social Impact 
Measures as 
Imprudent Surveying / 
Testing 
Negatively 
Impacts Product 
Demand 
• Profitability Needs Excludes Poorest 
• Measurement Burdens Poor - Takes Away from Productive Labor 
• BoP Avoid Products that Identify/Taint Them as Poor 
• Focus on Quantity Causes Harm to Quality and Needed Training/Info 
• When Investors Recommend Metrics, It Alters / Imposes Agenda on Or 
Measures Harm or 
Shift Focus Away 
from Most Needy 
Figure 1 – Social enterprises responses to the frictions inherent in 
social impact measurement 
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First-Level Categories Second Order Themes 
Aggregate 
Dimension 
 
• Unintended Consequences Always Happen 
• Individual Impacts Also Affect Greater Community 
• Impacts Not Seen Because Are Avoided Costs to Society 
• Not Understand Causality That Leads to Impacts - Esp. Health Related 
• Measures Ignore Complexity and Reduce Interconnectedness of Situations 
Definitionally/ 
Conceptually 
Incomplete 
• Emotional Choices Drive Decision to Accept 
• Data Doesn't Matter, Story Key to Justifying Impact 
• Utilitarianism Theoretical, But Gut Instinct / Intuition is What Actually Used 
• Don't Know Impact Details - It Just Makes Intuitive Sense 
• Sometimes Just Blind Trust 
Emotionally 
Incomplete 
• Parameters/Metrics Not Good Definitions of What Evaluating  
• Metrics Do Not Reflect Reality 
• Apply ToP Measures Inappropriately to BoP 
• Scale Measures Give Larger Impact to Cheaper Inventions 
Causally 
Incomplete 
• Needs - Varies Among Individual's Identity/Role Within BoP Community 
• Measures - Specific to Individual Projects 
• Impacts - Different Value of Same Impacts Based on Position –  BoP vs Non-BoP 
Granularity 
Incomplete 
• Need a Long Time, Years to Really Understand Enough to Develop Product 
• Customer Feedback/Testing Too Late in Process to Course Correct 
• Iterating from Pilot Testing is Time Consuming and Expensive, Like Starting Over 
• Testing Comes So Late in the Process that Most Facets Already Set 
Temporally 
Incomplete 
Social Impact 
Measures as 
Incomplete 
           
• Investors Never Go to a Site, Not Really Get Community Context 
• Measure s Not Integrated into National or Other Stats 
• Investors Not Know What Really Happening 
• Being in Different Geographic Region is a Big Barrier to Understanding 
• Lack of Familiarity Means Don't Have Context for Knowing Value 
• Parameters/Metrics Impose Western Definitions of Norms/Values 
Contextually 
Incomplete 
Figure 1 – Continued  
• Measures Not Integrated into National or Other Groups Stats - No Comparability 
• Lack of Standards Measuring Makes Serving BoP / Financial Supporter Difficult 
• Any Prior Measures Are Specific to Individual Projects 
• Investors Simply Don't Ask for Metrics of Impact  
• Investors Accept Whatever Metrics Measures Created by Organization 
• Don't Have to Justify Because Investors Believe Same Thing You Believe 
• Investors want mainly disclosure, to be kept informed and updated 
• Investors want numbers -- any numbers 
No Common 
Standards / 
Practices for 
Comparison 
Specific 
Methodology  
Not Important 
• Investors not ask about Specific impact 
• Impacts - Do Not Really Measure 
• Orgs should ignore Measures, not focus on them, Investors will come if you are doing 
good things 
• Don't Have to Justify Accountability to Anybody / No Institutional Mandate 
•  
Knowing Exact 
Amount of Impact 
Not Important 
• Utilitarian Models Too Complex 
• People Disagree on What Leads to Highest Utilitarian Value 
• Utilitarian Models Need Big Studies 
• Utilitarian Models Not Only Measures of Success for Orgs Utilitarian Models Mainly 
Used by Unsophisticated Investors 
• Utilitarian Models Not Important/Considered 
Utilitarian 
Optimization  
Not Possible 
         
Social Impact 
Measures as 
Irrelevant   
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Immeasurable 
 
Delegitimizes data’s accuracy and reliability of 
existing measures to serve as information upon 
which to base evaluations. 
 
• Data needed to perform impact 
evaluations is either fundamentally 
inaccurate and cannot be believed, or  
• Data is impossible to obtain 
(generally or within the specific 
circumstances of the social 
enterprise). 
 
 
 
Imprudent  
 
Delegitimizes data’s cost-benefit proposition of 
collecting certain measures to serve as 
information upon which to base evaluations. 
 
• Data collection too costly in terms of 
resources and/or managerial attention.  
• Resources better invested in other 
activities, even if those activities would 
be less optimal without the information.  
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Incomplete 
 
Delegitimizes theory’s ability to establish 
causal chain of impact of an enterprise’s 
intervention on an environment. 
 
• Analysis lacks sufficient information 
to account for the whole picture or all 
the confounding variables at play.  
• Interpretations of data are 
fundamentally insufficient and 
biased.  
 
 
 
Irrelevant 
 
Delegitimizes theory’s utility to guide decision-
making 
 
 
• Measures are irrelevant or unusable to 
predict future success or guide which 
course of action a funder or social 
entrepreneur should take. 
• Measures provide too great or too little 
precision.  
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Table 2 – Common At-Hand Impact Elements Used in Bricolage 
Measurement 
Element Description Example 
Scale Indicators 
Indication of 
number of people 
impacted or 
number of outputs 
generated. 
From a local craftwork enterprise: 
To date, [enterprise] has worked directly with 106 villages. We have 
benefitted 4,500 people while indirectly impacting 23,000 people 
through our various projects and activities.  
 
From an enterprise shifting consumers from wood to gas cooking:  
Since 200x, [enterprise] has earned over $1.7 million by building a 
customer base of over 4 thousand families who, on average, save about 
25% on cooking fuel costs. 
Product 
Design/Capability 
Data 
Design 
information that 
shows capability 
of product to 
improve lives or 
environment 
 
From a solar charging kiosk micro-enterprise: 
‘Our public kiosks attract customers and creates a physical location for 
additional retail product distribution and other business opportunities 
such as:  Secure storage for phones or additional products – The 
Kiosk’s Mobility allows it to locate strategically based on the market 
needs – 50W Solar Panel (as roof) – 20  DC outlets for phone charging 
– 34Ah of 12v battery storage’ 
 
From a solar cooking enterprise: 
‘The cookware heats up 5x quicker than traditional charcoal. That 
means you can start cooking faster. Zero toxic smoke and zero soot in 
your food means healthy cooking. Zero carbon emission. 100% 
recyclable. Engineered for a positive net impact.’ 
Identifiable 
Personal 
Connection 
Information to 
identify and build 
connection to 
specific 
individuals helped 
From a motorcycle taxi rent-to-own enterprise: 
Five mini-bios of taxi drivers with pictures of each sitting on 
enterprise’s motorcycles. 
 
From a chocolate farm for employing (previously unemployable) 
former child soldiers: 
A photo gallery of farmers at work. 
Information About 
Need 
Information to 
describe problems 
and needs 
enterprise aims to 
alleviate 
From a low-cost home insulation enterprise: 
‘Freezing temperatures throughout the 5-month winter means over one 
million Northern Pakistani households experience extreme winters” 
 
From a low-cost incubator product: 
‘15 million premature infants are born annually. 1.5 million of these 
premature infants die in resource-limited settings. Keeping these 
infants warm would save thousands of lives; there is a 28% increase in 
mortality and morbidity for every 1°C drop in infant body 
temperature.’ 
Conjectured 
Possibilities 
Assertions of ways 
individuals might 
suffer without 
intervention, or 
ways life might 
improve with 
intervention.  
For a bio-sanitation facility: 
‘The facility will provide affordable and hygenic sanitation services 
while also producing biogas for domestic use for nearby homes and 
local hotels. The bio-slurry fertilizer it generates will be used for agro-
forestry and greening the community. The center will ensure that 
human waste turns into wealth by generating gas through bio-digester 
systems and  by producing fertilizer.’ 
 
Representative 
Outcome or Best 
Outcome Achieved 
Specific stories of 
how individuals or 
communities 
benefited 
For low-cost, reusable menstrual hygiene product: 
‘This is [Woman’s Name]’s Story’ box with picture of woman and 
scan of a letter the woman wrote telling of her experience menstruating 
without menstrual hygiene products and thanking enterprise for their 
product which changed her life. 
Governmental, 
Industry, or 
Academic Data and 
Research 
General data and 
research findings 
relevant for, but 
not specific to, an 
intervention 
 
From an enterprise that builds latrines: 
We used data from the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program 
Economics of Sanitation Initiative 
(https://www.wsp.org/content/economic-impacts-sanitation) in order to 
estimate the average net annual savings per household achieved when 
households purchase an improved latrine.   
* These quotes were altered slightly to protect anonymity. 
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